Keynes' main concern in the General Theory is about the capacity of an economy to return to a full employment equilibrium when subject to a (negative) demand shock. He maintains that money wages cuts do not necessarily imply a fall in real wages and hence are not necessarily a cause of persistent unemployment. On the contrary, their rigidity may be considered as a necessary condition for avoiding that a cumulative process propels the economy far away the full employment equilibrium. Keynes' intuition is dynamic in nature, but as he builds on a static equilibrium framework, he has to rely on distortions in the price mechanism hard to defend when considering the long run.
Introduction
Neo-classical and new-keynesian economics alike have in common to de…ne and explain involuntary unemployment as the result of real wage rigidity. The neoclassical analysis also postulates a positive correlation between nominal and real wages (generally con…rmed by empirical observations) so that any cut in money wages should result in a cut in real wages. As a consequence, money wage rigidities associated with some speci…c bargaining arrangements on the labour market would be responsible for involuntary unemployment. According to Keynes instead, the wage bargains between the entrepreneurs and the workers do not determine the real wage, and "there may exist no expedient by which labour as a whole can reduce its real wage to a given …gure by making revised money bargains with the entrepreneurs" (Keynes 1936, p. 13) . That means that coordination failures at the system level rather than at the labour market level would be responsible for unemployment which will be then involuntary in the strict sense. Recent contributions can be considered as a revival of this line of analysis (Hart 1982 , D'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira, and Gérard-Varet 1990). They argue that imperfect competition in the markets for goods would be responsible for the existence of involuntary unemployment at a level of real wages inferior to the competitive (or Walrasian) one. In this framework coordination takes place ex ante on a strategic basis and results in a general equilibrium with involuntary unemployment the existence of which is clearly explained by the existence of …rms' (and unions) market power. Nevertheless, this unemployment could always be reduced, if not totally reabsorbed, thanks to a cut in real wages.
We share with Keynes the belief that coordination is the central issue in economic activity. But we think that it is better tackled by abandoning the equilibrium approach that characterizes Keynes' General Theory, and seeing the working of the economy as a sequential out-of-equilibrium process. Involuntary unemployment appears then as the result of a lack of coordination which emerges along the way, at each step, and cannot disappear simply by allowing price and wage ‡exibility. The study of out-of-equilibrium processes, in the Hicksian tradition (Hicks, 1973 , Amendola and Ga¤ard, 1988 ,1998 , allows to switch the focus from the analysis of price systems corresponding to alternative equilibrium states of the economy to the sequence of constrained decisions that describes an economic process taking place in time.
Unsurprisingly, the main results of the Keynesian analysis re-emerge in this di¤erent framework. However, our analysis makes it possible to advance farther along this line by extending to real wages Keynes' conclusions as regards money wages (thus challenging the classical inverse relation between real wages and unemployment). We show that (i) real as well as nominal rigidities, instead of being an obstacle to the attainments of full employment, may appear as an useful device for preventing an aggravation of unemployment, and hence that (ii) market imperfections may be a factor of stability of the system rather than an obstacle on the way to full optimal equilibrium. Finally, our analysis shifts the focus of monetary policy from its e¤ects on employment via changes in the distribution of income or in the burden of the debt to its e¤ects via the structure of productive capacity.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will shortly summarize Leijonhufvud's pioneering argument, that the General Theory may be seen as an "Essay on coordination", and will mention other 'Keynesian' contributions (Dreze 1997 , Stiglitz 1999 ) along the same line; we'll then underline some de…ciencies of these approaches, that in our opinion were crucial in the reabsorption of the Keynesian analysis within the mainstream. Section 3 will describe the approach that we propose along Hicksian lines, based on irreversibilities in the production and in the decision processes, which give a real temporal dimension to the analysis. Then in section 4 we shall show, by means of simulations, how Keynesian results emerge, more robustly, from this new approach. Section 5 concludes with an examination of the similarities and di¤erences between the Economics of Keynes and the approach proposed.
Coordination Problems and Price Rigidities
The standard IS-LM approach may lead and generally leads to interpret Keynes as a …x-price (and hence short run) case of the general Walrasian model. In this framework, unemployment can only stem from nominal rigidities in the relevant market, namely the one for labour. Leijonhufvud (1968) proposes instead the interpretation of the General Theory as an attempt to introduce problems of coordination in the Neoclassical model, thus subtracting it to the fate of a special case of the Neoclassical system. Furthermore, this interpretation brings to the foreground the problem that (the lack of) coordination poses. In this light, in particular, suboptimal equilibria cannot be reduced to a problem of prices which do not take their equilibrium value.
Leijonhufvud, on the other hand, claims that Keynes' main innovation lies in the method, i.e. the attempt to see unemployment as a disequilibrium phenomenon linked to the adjustment process following an exogenous disturbance. More speci…cally, according to Leijonhufvud, the Keynesian system adjusts primarily by way of real income movements. The main reason for this shift of focus from prices to quantities in the adjustment process lies in the refusal of the costless role of the auctioneer. Price adjustments require information that is costly and lengthy to acquire. This implies that the adjustment is not instantaneous, and the Walrasian hypothesis of trade only happening at equilibrium prices has to be dropped. Trades do happen at disequilibrium prices (false trading). This results in the appearance of constraints (the expression of problems of coordination) which hamper the realization of the agents' plans 1 . Hence "realized transaction quantities enter as arguments of the excess demand function in addition to (disequilibrium ) prices" (Leijonhufvud, 1968, p.56) .
In this interpretation the focus is shifted towards the role of the intertemporal price in coordination. In fact, coordination problems are mainly supposed to arise in the market for savings and investment, where agents with di¤erent time horizons interact. "Financial markets are manifestly incapable of providing for the consistency of long-term production and consumption plans...(which) does not insure a 'correct' value for the interest rate" (ibidem, p. 276). Entrepreneurs base their demand of loanable funds on the current rate of interest, while supply is determined on the secondary market by the portfolio choices of speculators who refer to the spread between expected and actual interest rates. A drop in the demand of loanable funds following an exogenous shock (say a fall in the marginal e¢ciency of capital), will not necessarily a¤ect expectations on the secondary market; consequently, the price mechanism will fail to recover coordination by re-establishing investment at its full employment level. Trade then takes place at a false price, at which ex ante savings and investment are not equated, and it is therefore income that has to change in order to restore the equality. The conclusion, according to Leijonhufvud, is obvious: "It was Keynes' position that it is the failure of the incomplete market mechanism to reconcile the implied values of forward demand and supplies [...] that is the source of the trouble. Unemployment of labor and other resources is a derivative phenomenon" (p. 276). Unemployment is the consequence of a missing market where investment and savings decisions should be coordinated.
If the 'source of the trouble' does not lie in the labour market, whose disequilibrium is only a 'derivative phenomenon', the hypothesis of …xed wages that stirred so much controversy acquires a very precise meaning; going back to Keynes, "If money-wages were to fall without limit whenever there was a tendency for less than full employment, [...] there would be no resting place below full employment until either the rate of interest was incapable of falling further, or wages were zero. In fact, we must have some factor, the value of which in terms of money is, if not …xed, at least sticky, to give us any stability of values in a monetary system" (Keynes, 1936, p. 303 ). Keynes reverses the common wisdom on wage rigidity. In his framework this becomes a necessary institutional feature to avoid the implosion of the system rather than a source of disequilibrium.
The belief that coordination failures cannot be identi…ed with price distortions and hence that price ‡exibility is not always the way to re-establish coordination is also shared by other authors who have turned again to the problem of price rigidity in a Keynesian perspective. Thus Drèze (1997) who analyzes the problem within a general equilibrium context with rationing, distinguishes between price 'notional' and 'e¤ective' demand, that only coincide when trade happens at equilibrium prices. Out of equilibrium the standard budget constraint of consumers is replaced by a liquidity (later known as cash-in-advance) constraint, and by an income constraint: distortions and coordination failures 2 as di¤erent sources of the appearance of supply constraints and of ine¢cient allocations of resources, and hence writes: "It is not obvious at all that price or wage adjustments susceptible of removing ine¢ciencies caused by price distortions would also operate in the right direction, or with any e¤ectiveness, to circumvent coordination failures"(ibid. p.1753). The real problem, then, is :"the movement from one supply-constrained equilibrium to another as a topic in dynamics, inviting the study of adjustment processes de…ned over prices (...), quantities, price expectations and plans"(ibid.).
This points to the consideration of coordination failures in an out-of-equilibrium context. In an equilibrium perspective, coordination results from a choice carried out ex ante. Coordination failures appear as a consequence of the existence of multiple Pareto ranked equilibria 3 : they are nothing but coordination on bad equilibria. However, given the gains expected from a better coordination, agents should in the long run be able to design institutions or coordination devices suf…cient to move away from a Pareto dominated equilibrium 4 .Out of equilibrium we have to deal instead with a process sketched out step by step by sequentially interacting disequilibria. Coordination problems arise as the result of this process taking place. But it is di¢cult to explain why these problems when reduced to false trading would persist in the long run. Exactly as it is di¢cult for the IS-LM approach to argue that nominal rigidities would not be removed in the long run, it is not clear in fact, in the Keynes-Leijonhufvud framework, why households would keep hoarding money balances in the long run, or why a future market would not be created 5 whose price were able to coordinate consumers and investors' long term plans. Our claim is that the problem caused by trading at disequilibrium prices lies not so much in the persistence of these prices, which is theoretically hard to defend, but rather into two features of this trading that are mentioned but not developed by Keynes and Leijonhufvud: the appearance of quantity constraints that at each moment in time a¤ect the agent's plans; and the sequence of suboptimal choices triggered by these constraints which renders the very notion of an equilibrium price meaningless as the price itself would change continuously along adjustment processes.
An attempt to investigate the main aspects of these adjustment processes has recently been made by Stiglitz (1999) , who stresses that : "the risks associated with wage and price adjustments may well be larger than those associated with output adjustments"(ibid. p.76), and that : "shocks lead to marked changes in relative prices, and those disturbances in relative prices greatly exacerbate economic ‡uctuations"(ibid. p.75).
The adjustment process as a process aimed at re-establishing coordination is also at the center of the analysis proposed in this paper which, however, focusses on restructuring of productive capacity as the essential aspect of the process itself. What really matters in fact are the e¤ects of the exchanges at disequilibrium prices on the stocks of the economy, which are the link between periods during the sequential process that shapes out the adjustment. Both Leijonhufvud and Stiglitz have already dealt with …nancial stocks, with particular reference to the impact of changes in asset values on the adjustment process.
Real stocks, and the interaction with …nancial stocks, are instead at the center of our analysis. We appeal to a model whose main characteristic is the articulation in time both of the production process, and hence of the cost-revenue pro…le, and of the decision process. Only in such a framework in fact it is possible to properly study the problems of coordination over time of economic activity, and the sequence of constrained decisions that make up the disequilibrium process mentioned but not developed by Leijonhufvud, Drèze and Stiglitz. The next section presents the sequential model proposed, based on Hicks (1973) and Ga¤ard (1988, 1998 ).
The Model
Consider a sequential economy of a neo-Austrian type which uses a homogeneous labour resource. Labour is inputted for n periods to build the productive capacity, and used for the following N to operate it and obtain a …nal output. An elementary process of production is de…ned by input coe¢cients such that: The productive capacity of the economy is given by the number of processes in use at the moment t, in construction, x c (t); and in utilization, x u (t):
This capacity is subject to ageing and to modi…cations due to investment and scrapping. The economy enters each period with a given productive capacity, and a set of prices for labour (w(t)) and for the …nal output (p(t)): These prices only change at the junction between periods, while within the period market disequilibria result in supply or demand rationing. In other words, this is a …x-price model (Hicks 1956 ).
At the beginning of the period, …rms choose how much to produce and how much to invest, subject to a number of constraints. Desired supply is determined adaptively 6 from demand observed in the previous period:
with hats denoting desired quantities. g ¤ d (t) is a weighted average of ¿ past values of the growth rate g d 7 .
Desired supply may be greater or smaller than the sum of productive capacity and the unsold stocks carried over by previous periods which is put back in the market. In the …rst case, the …rm will be constrained and hence produce at its maximum capacity. Otherwise, it will be forced to partially utilize (or equivalently to scrap) some processes.
where the tilda denote constrained quantities. While they form demand expectations on a day-by-day basis, …rms recognize that investment is an inherently long term phenomenon, and hence do not alter their behaviour in response to short term disequilibria. Investment (i.e. construction) decisions are always taken such as to maintain a balanced structure of productive capacity: the planned number of new processes is the one consistent with the steady state (long run) position of the economy:
where g ¤ is the steady state growth rate of the economy. Firm's planned production and investment decisions are constrained by available …nancial or human resources: The total of wages that they plan to pay is!
where L d is the total demand for labour, w the wage rate, andx u (t) is either x u (t) or x u (t): Firms demand external …nancial resources to pay whatever of this wage fund is not covered by internal resources:
6 Backward looking behaviour may be seen as the more rational (in terms of costs) choice by boundedly rational agents facing a complex environment.
7 If¸= 1; we have static expectations (d ¤ (t) = d(t ¡ 1)), while ¿ = 1 is the standard adaptive expectations case:
Internal resources are revenues (m), plus money balances (h f ), carried over from the previous period, minus the take-out (c), and whatever …rms desire to hoard in the current period (h f d ). The take-out, c(t);de…ned as the fraction of available …nancial resources not spent on production processes (which might stand for private and/or social consumption) is such that c(t) = ¹ [m(t ¡ 1) + f(t)] : The di¤erence between the total of wages that …rms plan to pay and the available internal resources gives the demand for external money resources f d .
External money demand is matched with money supply f s , exogenously determined by the monetary authority choosing among alternative monetary policies:
where g f is a growth rate of the money supply which may be equal to the steady state growth rate of the economy g ¤ , g f d is the growth rate of the money demand which may be higher than g ¤ , and g p is the expected growth rate of the price level. With ³ = 0 a Friedman rule is applied while with ³ = 1, broadly speaking, a Taylor rule prevails. In the latter case » and & are the weights of growth and in ‡ation objectives respectively.
It may be the case, if f d (t) > f s (t); that …rms incur in a …nancial constraint. Consequently they will not be able to carry on their investment as planned:
The …rm may also be limited by the amount of labour available on the market. Labour supply evolves as follows:
where g pop is the exogenous population growth rate, and g w (t ¡ 1) is the growth rate of wage. Labour demand on the other hand is given by
If …rms incur in a human resource constraint (L d > L s ), they will be forced to cumulate money stocks (h f ), while if the contrary holds, unemployment will appear.
Once the labour market is opened, and wages are paid, production takes place. The last market to open is the market for …nal output, where demand and supply are matched. In case of market disequilibria we can have involuntary accumulation of real stocks (o) by …rms or monetary stocks (h h ) by households:
or:
Internal …nance constraints derive from these market disequilibria:
This marks the end of the period. At the junction between periods wages and prices change in response to disequilibria in the goods and labour markets:
where g p and g w are the rates of change of the price and the wage rate, respectively. Between periods we also have ageing of productive capacity:
In equilibrium this model behaves as a standard exogenous growth model. All variables grow at the population growth rate, and per capita income and consumption are constant. Expectations are ful…lled, coordination between construction and utilization is attained, no constraints appear, and no stocks cumulate. The characteristic of this model is nevertheless that it allows to analyze behaviours outside equilibrium, a …eld in which mainstream theory has little to say. We shall see in the next section that, in the spirit of Keynes, the out-of-equilibrium path may lead to cumulative processes, and that price stickiness may in that case be necessary to avoid the implosion of the system. Numerical simulations allow to explore how the model behaves out of equilibrium.
Simulations' Results
Demand or supply shocks may be at the origin of out-of-equilibrium adjustment processes. Some such processes will be analyzed simulating the dynamics of the model described in the preceding section. We will analyze the paths followed by the economy hit by a shock under di¤erent degrees of price and wage ‡exibility.
Here shocks matter only because they trigger adjustment processes. Our main focus is on the loss of coordination following the shocks, and on the role of di¤erent institutions (price and wage setting mechanisms, monetary policies) in helping or hampering the recovery of coordination. The essential role of these coordination mechanisms is attested, as we shall see, by the result that the same normative conclusions are obtained whatever the nature of the shock considered.
Let us start by describing in detail the e¤ects of a demand shock. Consider an economy in a steady-state (at a rate g ¤ = 0), and assume that after twenty periods, a part ½ of the current income of the …rms is suddenly hoarded because of a change in long term expectations that results in a lack of con…dence in the existing state of a¤airs:
The shock stirs an out-of-equilibrium process which, given the value of the control variables f(t) and c(t), mainly depends on the prevailing price and wage regimes. The case of …xed prices and wages is depicted in …gures 1. Hoarding by …rms reduces the wage fund: (20)]; consequently, the income perceived by the workers and their demand are reduced.
An excess supply appears in the market for …nal output, and undesired stocks cumulate (¢o(20) > 0) . In the following period, desired supply drops (because of adaptive expectations on the …rms side), and stocks are put back on the market. As a consequence the desired production is lower than productive capacity, and the …rms scrap some processes in the utilization phase. On the other hand, as we assume that the shock only lasts one period, money balances from previous periods are put back on the market. Thus we have excess demand on the market for …nal output (and, hence, undesired monetary stocks accumulated by households); the excess supply on the labour market persists, as production drops.
Due to the excess demand for …nal output the desired supply increases in the next period. However, as the available revenues from the previous periods are lower than they would be in the original steady-state, the external …nancial resources should increase at a higher rate to …nance desired production and investment. If this is not the case, as we assume in the simulation (³ = 0), the …rms will be unable to invest as much as they want. The wage fund is thus reduced, demand becomes the short side of the market and …rms cumulate real stocks.
The simulation shows an alternation of excesses of supply and demand which are gradually reduced as the adjustment process goes on (…gures 1). Each time the level of activity will drop, until a point where the wage fund will stop falling, and the demand will not further decrease. This will happen when expected and realized demand coincide. In the new situation, on the one hand …nancial constraints result in recurrent ‡uctuations in the rate of starts, which cannot be maintained at its previous equilibrium level. On the other hand supply and demand for …nal output are equal at a level which implies underutilization of labour. Summing up, the system settles on an pseudo-equilibrium characterized by a lower level of activity and positive unemployment.
This …rst set of simulations highlights the crucial role of wages as a component of demand. The decrease of the wage fund feeds back into the value of demand, which in turn causes scrapping and a further decrease of the wage fund. One may think that this 'Keynesian' e¤ect is caused by the hypothesis of …xed prices, and that by allowing su¢cient ‡exibility, the variation of prices and wages should bring the system back to equilibrium. This is what was checked next.
By allowing the money wage rate, and hence the real wage rate, to change (· = 0 and º = 0:05), as in …gures 2, the shock is not reabsorbed, and the system collapses. We said above that with …xed prices and wages the decrease of demand happens at a decreasing rate, so that desired supply sooner or later catches up. In this case, demand starts decreasing, and supply follows with a one period lag. This means that we continuously observe wage de ‡ation (due to the recurrent excess supply, and unemployment), which keeps a¤ecting demand negatively by further reducing the wage fund. The process continues until there are no processes left in utilization, and the system collapses.
The result suggested by the analysis of a particular time series is con…rmed by a Monte Carlo experiment on a set of 900 simulations corresponding to di¤erent wage reaction coe¢cients randomly chosen in a given interval [0; 0:5] ; with …xed price, by means of the Monte Carlo method. For all these simulations unemployment has increased and real wages have decreased at the end of the run (…gures 3).
The conjecture that it is the wage behaviour that hampers the viability is con…rmed by making prices ‡exible, while wages are kept constant. Figures 4 show the same Monte Carlo experiment, but having the price coe¢cient randomly chosen, while the wage rate is …xed. In most cases unemployment has slightly increased and real wages have slightly decreased at the end of the run, that is a new equilibrium has been reached. The e¤ect of price ‡exibility is not as disruptive, because price drops a¤ect at the same time demand and supply. Now suppose that the same economy as before is hit by a di¤erent (and positive) type of shock: the introduction of a superior technology characterized by an increase in construction costs more than compensated by the reduction of costs in the following phase of utilization of the new productive capacity 8 .
Similarly to the demand case, Monte Carlo simulations con…rm the robustness of the …ndings. By drawing the wage reaction coe¢cients from the interval [0; 0:5] ;we can see that unemployment has increased and real wages have decreased at the end of the run (…gures 5). And similarly to the demand case, price variability does not seem to be a problem: …gures 6 show that in most of the cases, a new equilibrium with limited unemployment, and only slightly lower real wages, has been reached.
The reader will have noticed that the qualitative behaviour, in the cases of supply and demand shocks, is extremely similar; this con…rms our claim that the shock is only a trigger; the policy conclusion is then that the design of institutions suited to facilitate the recovery of coordination has to be independent of the type 8 In the simulations we used a c = a u = 8; for the old technology, while for the new we have a c = 10 and a u = 5: The new technology is on average labour saving, but involves a larger e¤ort in construction. The e¤ects of technological shocks in the Hicksian framework have been extensively studied in Amendola and Ga¤ard (1998).
of shock.
To summarize the results, price and (especially) wage variability are unable to act as coordinating devices as is the case in the Neoclassical model; we share this conclusion with Keynes. Furthermore, we believe, with him, that monetary policy has an essential role in reabsorbing the shock; but in both cases, the underlying reasons are di¤erent. In our model monetary policy is essential in dealing with liquidity constraints. Take the case of a demand shock with ‡exible wages. In …gures 2, demand ‡uctuations cannot be adequately dealt with by …rms, because any attempt to invest and to bring productive capacity to its full employment level is frustrated by the lack of …nancial means. If we assumed (as in …gures 7) a completely accommodating monetary policy on the part of the central bank (or equivalently a perfectly e¢cient …nancial market) (³ = 1, » = 1; and & = 0), investment would not be constrained, the distortion of productive capacity would only be temporary, and the shock would not result in permanent unemployment. The only particular feature would be a constant excess demand in money terms, which would not be re-absorbed given that prices are …xed. Similarly with a supply shock -where a liquidity constraint initially prevents the …rms from maintaining the investment required by the new technology, and hence results in a permanent unemployment -if we assumed an accommodating monetary policy the economy would converge to a full employment equilibrium (…gures 8).
Notice in conclusion that the simulations, together with the question of trading at false prices discussed in section 2, clarify the analytical di¤erence between perfect ‡exibility and strong variability of prices and wages. The very concept of ‡exibility relies on a tautology if by perfectly ‡exible we mean that prices and wages are at every instant at the value that equates supplies and demands. Not to be trapped into the tautology, ‡exibility must rather be conceived as strong price variability within the context of non clearing markets. The relation between employment and ‡exibility appears then under a completely di¤erent light. We just saw that it will be in fact the result of a complex adjustment process, and will depend on how this process actually evolves. Trading at false prices creates constraints and incentives that induce …rms to take wrong production and investment decisions. And what happens sequentially to productive capacity is the reason of co-ordination problems which arise during adjustment processes. Thus the problem lies not so much in the persistence of a wrong price than in the e¤ects on the structure of productive of an excessive volatility.
Similarities and Di¤erences
The fundamental issue raised by Keynes is whether an economy hit by a (negative) demand shock is able to return to a full employment equilibrium. One of the major results that he obtains is that money wage ‡exibility is not a good means for reestablishing this equilibrium, as it would not "have the e¤ect of reducing real wages and might even have the e¤ect of increasing them, through its adverse in ‡uence on the volume of output" (Keynes 1936, p. 269 ) . Furthermore, resistance to money wages cuts is not necessarily a cause of persistent unemployment. On the contrary, it may be considered as a necessary condition for avoiding that a cumulative process propels the economy far away the full employment equilibrium. The emphasis on real wage e¤ects also shows a distinguishing feature (and in our opinion a limit) of Keynes' unemployment theory, namely that it remains an essentially static theory, still …rmly rooted into the classical inverse relation between real wage and employment. However, as D. Patinkin puts it "once we throw o¤ the restrictions of static equilibrium analysis, we also free ourselves of the necessity of assuming wage rigidity as a necessary precondition of involuntary unemployment. For, during any given period of time, the dynamic workings of the system may well keep the workers at a point o¤ their supply curve . In this departure from the supply curve lies the involuntariness of unemployment. The important point is that this situation can exist regardless of the shape of supply curve; that is, even if wages are not rigid " (Patinkin 1972 p. 30) .
The model we presented avoids the limits of Keynes' static approach. As a consequence, there is no longer an inverse relation between real wage and employment. Decreasing nominal wages may have the e¤ect of reducing real wages. But, in this case, unemployment, instead of being re-absorbed, is still increasing. A major result of our sequential analysis of out-of-equilibrium processes, is that wage ‡exibility does not necessarily help to restore equilibrium face to an exogenous shock, whatever the nature of the shock; more than that, it may be harmful, by triggering processes that bring the economy farther and farther from equilibrium; this con…rms the conclusions of Keynes as regards money wages ‡exibility, but extends this conclusion also to real wages ‡exibility. The reason for this result is that when adjustment is not instantaneous (both in the agent's decision processes and in the technological structure), and actions are irreversible, a frictionless system may become extremely unstable, while what are generally seen as 'market imperfections' contribute to smooth the e¤ects of 'wrong' actions, and hence help maintaining the system viable. In a world characterized by adaptive behaviours, and by a temporally articulated production structure, the conventional wisdom is reversed: market imperfections may be a factor of stability of the system rather than an obstacle on the way to fully optimal equilibria. More speci…cally, given the characteristics of the system, the rigidity of wages is necessary to keep the system itself viable.
We stressed nevertheless that Keynes does not succeed in developing a dynamic framework, and hence has to rely on short run distortions in the price mechanism hard to defend when considering the long run. In our framework this result obtains because of intrinsic characteristics of the system (the existence of irreversibilities) and hence problems of coordination appear both in the long and short run.
Another point of contact between our analysis and the Keynesian approach is the importance of monetary policy. As stressed by Keynes, "while a ‡exible wage policy and a ‡exible money policy come, analytically, to the same thing, inasmuch as they are alternative means of changing the quantity of money in terms of wage units, in other respects there is, of course, a world of di¤erence between them" (Keynes 1936 , p. 267) .
The 'world of di¤erence' between these two instruments, in Keynes, in the neoclassical synthesis of Patinkin (1965) , and more recently in Stiglitz (1999) 9 , is mainly distributional, concerning the burden of the adjustment. By focusing on the problems of coordination faced by a perturbed economy, our numerical experiments suggest another di¤erence, namely the opposite e¤ects of these policies on employment via the structure of productive capacity. A ‡exible or accommodating monetary policy allows to smooth liquidity constraints while the e¤ect of ‡exible wages is to aggravate the distortions in the structure of productive capacity. In our analysis there is no analytical equivalence between monetary policy and wage ‡exibility, and hence the di¤erence between the two instruments may not be reduced to a problem of 'social opportunity'.
To conclude, we believe that both Keynes and Leijonhufvud had the right intuition, when they perceived involuntary unemployment as the outcome of a disequilibrium process. This aspect of their analysis was nevertheless dropped in favour of a simpler static framework, in which the whole issue of coordination was reduced to a problem of Pareto inferior equilibria. This paper represents an attempt to focus on the problems of intertemporal coordination posed by a sequential economy in order to recover the original Keynesian intuition. Our results support the intuition, and unemployment emerges as the result of a lack of coordination, which is hampered by irreversible constrained choices. We believe that in doing so we succeed in strengthening Keynes' analysis, and in freeing his policy prescriptions from the fate of short run tools. 
